You can even retain a firm like Hubbard, Snitchler & Parzianello and still have a terrible outcome as illustrated below.

After the alleged fraud scheme began to surface in 2021, Kirk paid Hubbard, Snitchler and Parzianello $3,000 to consult with them. Thereafter, Linda Smith retained the firm to bring claims to contest the 2017 Restatement for fraud and undue influence.

Mark Snitchler, the senior attorney primarily responsible for the matter and Kevin Majewski, an associate, brought a proceeding to amend Linda's complaint to add a claim for fraud and undue influence. Unfortunately, that was unsuccessful. However, they timely filed a petition under the provisions of MCL 700.7604(1)(a) by the skin of their teeth.

The pleadings filed on Linda's behalf did not assert the definitional framework mandated by MCL 700.1102--including MCL 700.1107(k) or (n), nor MCL 700.7103(n) essential to construe MCL 700.7604(1)(b) and MCL 700.7814--nor did they invoke MCL 700.7303(d) or MCL 700.1403(b)(ii)(D), despite their direct relevance to the issues of beneficiary representation, conflicts of interest, notice under MCL 700.7604(1)(b), and the binding effect of probate proceedings. In light of Snitchler's extensive experience in estate and trust administration, these omissions raise significant questions regarding whether all controlling statutory authority necessary to protect Linda's interests were presented to the probate court.

Had the firm presented the definitional framework mandated by MCL 700.1102, together with the representation and conflict-of-interest provisions of MCL 700.7303(d) and MCL 700.1403(b)(ii)(D), the probate court would have been required to determine, as a threshold matter, whether the trustee possessed legal authority to represent or bind qualified trust beneficiaries whose interests had become adverse to his own, and whether the notice transmitted by that conflicted trustee via U.S. Mail satisfied the mandatory requirements of MCL 700.7604(1)(b). Those statutory provisions are not collateral to the analysis; they define whether the notice provisions of MCL 700.7604(1)(b) could operate to bind beneficiaries and commence the six-month limitations period in the first instance.

Proper application of that statutory framework would also have required the probate court to determine whether the trustee transmitted copies of all relevant portions of the amendments to the Ralph A. Siddell Living Trust that described or affected the interests of Linda Smith, Kirk A. Siddell, and All Saints Episcopal Church, as required by MCL 700.7604(1)(b). If the trustee failed to provide all amendments or trust provisions affecting those interests, a substantial question exists whether the statutory notice was legally sufficient to trigger the six-month limitations period. Likewise, if the trustee's authority to represent or bind beneficiaries was limited by conflicts of interest under MCL 700.7303(d) and MCL 700.1403(b)(ii)(D), a substantial question also exists whether the probate court could properly enter orders binding those beneficiaries or extinguishing their rights based upon that notice.

The omission of these controlling statutory provisions from the legal analysis did not merely affect the outcome of a single limitations issue. It deprived the probate court of the complete statutory framework enacted by the Legislature to determine whether the trustee possessed authority to invoke MCL 700.7604(1)(b), whether beneficiaries were properly represented and bound, and whether the extraordinary consequence of extinguishing beneficiary rights through the operation of a statute of limitations was legally authorized.

The pleadings filed by Mark Snitchler and Kevin Majewski (now with Madden Hauser) illustrate the broader systemic concerns identified in this submission. Although both attorneys possessed substantial experience in estate and trust matters, the pleadings did not present the definitional framework mandated by MCL 700.1102, nor did they raise the relevance of MCL 700.7303(d) or MCL 700.1403(b)(ii)(D) to the probate court's analysis of MCL 700.7604(1)(b). As a result, the court was not asked to determine whether the trustee possessed authority to represent or bind beneficiaries whose interests had become adverse to his own, or whether the statutory notice transmitted by the trustee was legally sufficient to commence the six-month limitations period.

The significance of these omissions extends beyond this individual case. They illustrate how even experienced practitioners can overlook the mandatory interaction between EPIC's definitional framework, its representation provisions, and its notice provisions. When those statutory provisions are not presented and applied together, MCL 700.7604(1)(b) can be construed in a manner that extinguishes otherwise legitimate claims alleging fraud, undue influence under MCL 700.7406, breach of fiduciary duty, or the financial exploitation of elderly vulnerable adults before those claims can reasonably be discovered and investigated.

The Legislature is to be commended for enacting these important statutory protections. However, like all statutory safeguards, they can protect beneficiaries only when they are identified, presented to the court, and applied in practice. When controlling statutory provisions are omitted from judicial proceedings, the protections intended by the Legislature can become ineffective, notwithstanding their clear inclusion within EPIC.