Like Linda, you might retain an attorney like Mark Snitchler from the firm of Hubbard, Snitchler & Parzianello. You can pay them over $130,000.00 and still have a terrible outcome from the attorney's serious legal error due to their neglect and failure to assert all essential laws. Check it out below.

After the alleged fraud scheme began to surface in January of 2021, Kirk Siddell paid the firm of Hubbard, Snitchler and Parzianello $3,000 to consult with them. Linda Smith eventually retained the firm to bring claims to contest the 2017 Restatement to the Ralph A. Siddell Living Trust for fraud and undue influence.

Mark Snitchler, the senior attorney primarily responsible for the matter at Hubbard, Snitchler & Parzianello, along with associate Kevin Majewski, brought a proceeding to amend Linda's complaint to add a claim for fraud and undue influence. That petition was unsuccessful due to the dishonesty of David R. Heilman's attorneys at Miller Johnson, and an inexperienced probate court, and a probate judge who was delegating his duties to the probate register. However, by the skin of his teeth, Snitchler timely filed a petition under the provisions of MCL 700.7604(1)(a).

Notwithstanding that petition, the pleadings Snitchler and Majewski filed on behalf of Linda never raised the definitional framework mandated by MCL 700.1102 -- including MCL 700.7103(n), MCL 700.1107(k) or (n)--that are essential to construe the provisions of MCL 700.7604(1)(b) and comply with the disclosure duties under MCL 700.7814. In addition, the pleadings the filed reflect Snitchler never invoked MCL 700.7303(d) or MCL 700.1403(b)(ii)(D)--provisions that limit the trustee's ability to represent and bind beneficiaries or the probate court's ability to enter orders binding beneficiaries--despite their direct relevance to the issues of trustee's authority, beneficiary representation, conflicts of interest, notice under MCL 700.7604(1)(b), and the binding effect of probate proceedings.

In light of Snitchler's purported experience in estate and trust administration, his omissions illustrate significant systemic vulnerabilities in Michigan law, and document that despite purported experience, he failed to raise all statutory authority essential to protect Linda's interests. Further, he caused an appeal brief to be filed untimely.

Had Snitchler's firm presented the definitional framework mandated by MCL 700.1102, together with the representation and conflict-of-interest provisions of MCL 700.7303(d) and MCL 700.1403(b)(ii)(D), to the probate court, the probate court would have been required to determine, as a threshold matter, whether the trustee possessed legal authority to represent or bind qualified trust beneficiaries whose interests had become adverse to his own, and whether the notice transmitted by that conflicted trustee via U.S. Mail satisfied the mandatory requirements of MCL 700.7604(1)(b).

Those statutory provisions are not discretionary. They define whether the notice provisions of MCL 700.7604(1)(b) could operate to bind beneficiaries and commence the six-month limitations period in the first instance.

Proper application of that statutory framework would also have required the probate court to determine whether the trustee transmitted copies of all relevant portions of the amendments to the Ralph A. Siddell Living Trust that described or affected the interests of Linda Smith, Kirk A. Siddell, and All Saints Episcopal Church, as required by MCL 700.7604(1)(b). Since the trustee failed to provide all amendments or trust provisions affecting those interests, the notice was legally insufficient to trigger the six-month limitations period to bar beneficiary claims.

Likewise, if the trustee's authority to represent or bind beneficiaries was limited by conflicts of interest under MCL 700.7303(d) and MCL 700.1403(b)(ii)(D), the probate court could not properly enter orders binding beneficiaries or extinguishing their rights based upon notice transmitted by a disqualified trustee.

The omission of these controlling statutory provisions from the legal analysis did not merely affect the outcome, it deprived the probate court of the complete statutory framework enacted by the Legislature to determine whether the trustee possessed authority to even invoke MCL 700.7604(1)(b), whether the notice complied with the provisions of MCL 700.7604(1)(b), whether beneficiaries were properly represented and bound, and whether the extraordinary consequence of extinguishing beneficiary rights through the operation of a statute of limitations that was not properly invoked, was legally authorized.

The pleadings filed by Mark Snitchler and Kevin Majewski (now with Madden Hauser) illustrate the broader systemic concerns identified in this submission. Although both attorneys possessed substantial experience in estate and trust matters, the pleadings did not present the definitional framework mandated by MCL 700.1102, nor did they raise the relevance of MCL 700.7303(d) or MCL 700.1403(b)(ii)(D) to the probate court's analysis of MCL 700.7604(1)(b). As a result, the court was not asked to determine whether the trustee possessed authority to represent or bind beneficiaries whose interests had become adverse to his own, or whether the statutory notice transmitted by the trustee was legally sufficient to commence the six-month limitations period.

The significance of these omissions illustrates how even experienced practitioners can overlook the mandatory interaction between EPIC's definitional framework, its representation provisions, and its notice provisions. When those statutory provisions are not presented and applied together, MCL 700.7604(1)(b) can be construed in a manner that extinguishes otherwise legitimate claims alleging fraud, undue influence under MCL 700.7406, breach of fiduciary duty, or the financial exploitation of elderly vulnerable adults before those claims can reasonably be discovered and investigated. The result is that financial exploitation can remain undetected, along with related financial and tax irregularities.

The Michigan Legislature is to be commended for enacting a sophisticated and important statutory framework. However, like all statutory safeguards, they only protect beneficiaries when they are identified, presented to the court, and applied in practice. When controlling statutory provisions are omitted from judicial proceedings--either innocently or intentionally--the protections intended by the Legislature are ineffective, notwithstanding their clear inclusion within EPIC.

Most of Michigan's probate courts are in districts with one, maybe two judges. Often they are inexperienced with complicated trust laws and administration, allowing the same scenario presented above to be played out in multiple districts over and over.

Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct

Rule 8.3(a) states:

(a) A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a significant violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer shall inform the Attorney Grievance Commission.

It is believed that neither Snitchler nor Majewski reported the concealment, false representations or circumvention of Michigan law by Jeffrey K. Helder, Robert D. Brower, Angela M. Caulley or Thomas Kuiper of Kuiper Kraemer as reflected in the documentary record.